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THE ASSUMPTION OF ENCUMBRANCES BY THE
PURCHASER OF LAND.
WHEN the owner of encumbered realty sells it, what are the
legal relations established with respect to the encumbrance ?
1. Between him and the vendee?
2. Between the vendee and the owner of the encumbrance?
3. Between the heirs or devisees of the vendee and his personal
representatives in the administration of his estate ?
In England the purchaser of even an equity of redemption is
held liable in equity to indemnify his grantor against ever paying
the encumbrances, whether he stipulated to do so or not. In War-
ing v. Ward, 7 Yes. 333, Lord ELDON said: "The same principle
applies to the purchase of an equity of redemption; for the party
means at the time of the contract to buy the estate subject to that
mortgage in relation to which mortgage the personal contract was
entered into, and that was not his. If he enters into no obliga-
tion with the party from whom he purchases, neither by bond nor
by covenant of indemnity to save him harmless from the mortgage,
yet this court, if he receive possession and has the profits, would,
independent of contract, raise upon his conscience an obligation to
indemnify the vendor against the personal obligation to pay the
money due upon the vendor's transaction of mortgage; for being
become owner of the estate he must be supposed to intend to
indemnify the vendor against the mortgage." Even if the grantee
of ncumbered premises expressly covenant to pay the encumbrances,
* his obligation is construed to be nothing more than an undertaking
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to indemnify his grantor. See Mr. Cox's note to the case of Eelyn
v. Evelyn, 2 P. Wins. 664. The reason of these decisions seems to
be that the grantor has allowed the grantee to retain the amount
of the mortgage-debt in his hands out of the purchase-money, and
the grantee has accordingly bought the premises just so much
cheaper.
No legal relation whatever appears to be established between
the owner of the encumbrance and the vendee, by transactions be-
tween vendor and vendee, to which the encumbrancer is not a party.
In the administration of the estates of vendees of encumbered
realty, the question constantly arose between the personalty and the
realty as to which fund should bear the encumbrances. Although
the personalty is the primary fund for the payment of decedent's
debts, the realty remained the primary fund for payment of
encumbrances thereon, unless the decedent had made them his per-
sonal debts, in which case they were thrown for payment, like all
his other debts, upon the personalty.
The decedent was not held to have made them his personal debts
by having expressly contracted to pay them, because that he would
have been .bound to do with or without stipulation: Waring v.
Ward, supra; and, therefore, no intent to make the encumbrances
his personal debts could be inferred from that act. In Tweddell v.
Tweddell, 2 Bro. 0. C. 101, A. having bought premises, subject to
an existing mortgage, which he expressly covenanted to pay to the
mortgagee by name, and to indemnify his grantor therefrom, devised
the same to B. B. having applied to be exonerated out of the -per-
sonal estate for the mortgage, TnURLoW, Ld. Oh., held, that the
testator's covenant was merely to indemnify his grantor, and that
he had, not made himself liable at law to the mortgagee, and of con-
sequence had not made the debt his, so that it should be paid by his
executors. And upon re-argument he affirmed the decree, saying:
"This appears to be a common case where a man buys an equity
of redemption. The question is whether he becomes personally lia-
ble to the mortgagee. The buyer takes it subject to the charge,
but the debt as to him is a real, not a personal debt. His contract
with the mortgagor is only that the debt shall not fall upon him;
it is a mere contract of indemnity, as he would be bound without
any specific contract to indemnify him as long as he can pay the
money." Lord ALVANLEY, in Woods v. Huntingford, 3 Yes. 180,
approved Tweddell v. Tweddell, the principle of which he "said
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was, "that where a man buys subject to a mortgage, and has no
connection or contract or communication with the mortgagee, and
does no other act to show an intention to transfer that debt from
the estate to himself, as between his heir and executor, but merely
that which he must do if he pays a less price in consequence of
that mortgage, that is, indemnifies the vendor against it, he does
not by that act take the debt upon himself personally." But he
held also that a man might make an encumbrance his own personal
debt, without an express declaration that he intended to do so, as
by contracting directly with the creditor in a new and different
instrument, and giving further security for a further advance. See
also Earl of Oxford v. Lady Rodney, 14 Yes. 420; Barham v.
Earl of Thanet, 3 M. & K. 607, and Townmhend v. Afostyn, 26
Beav. 72. But even a personal covenant with the owner of an
existing encumbrance for its payment if it be not otherwise altered,
though it makes the vendee liable at law, has been held in the
administration of his estate to be merely collateral to the charge
upon the land, and not to show an intention to make the debt his
own: Tankerville v. Faucett, iShafto v. Shafto, Mattheson v.
Hardwicke, cited in note to Evelyn v. -Evelyn, supra; Hedges v.
Hedges, 5 DeG. & Sm. 330.
Parsons v. Freeman, quoted in a note to the case of Evelyn. v.
Evelyn, supra, and Belvedere v. Bockfort, 5 Br. P. C. 299, are
often quoted as inconsistent with these views. In the former, "A.
purchased an estate for 907., which was at the time mortgaged for
861., and he covenanted to pay 861. to the mortgagee, and 41. to the
vendor. The court (Lord HARDWICKE) * * * thought that although
the covenant was with the vendor only, and the vendee's personal
estate therefore not liable in that respect to the mortgagee, yet the
words were sufficiently strong to show an intention in the vendee to
make it his personal debt." In the latter, the consideration was
9001., of which 450L. were paid in cash, and the balance repre-
sented by a mortgage, "which said principal money of 4501., with
the interest thereof from the 10th day of February last, is to be
paid and discharged by the said Robert Rockfort out of the consid-
eration-money in this deed expressed." The receipt endorsed on
the deed was for "4501. sterling in money on the perfection of the
deed, and 4501. allowed on account of the mortgage. The House
of Lords affirmed the decree of the Irish Chancery that the ances-
tor had made the encumbrance his personal debt." So far as the
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question of the decedent's intention to make the mortgage his per.
sonal debt is concerned, both these decisions were within the prin-
ciple of Tweddell r. Tweddell, supra, as qualified by Wood8 v.
Huntinord, and the only doubt is as to the application of the
principle, viz.: whether there was enough in the facts of either case
to justify the court in finding that the vendee had shown an inten-
tion to do so. In Butler v. Butler, 5 Yes. Jr. 534, a mortgagee took
title to premises in consideration of releasing the owner from a mort-
gage-debt to him, and of covenanting to pay a prior mortgagee. The
facts being thus similar to those in Parsons v. -Freeman, Lord
A.vAw-n.Y came to an opposite conclusion. And Lord THuRLow
applied the principle quite as strictly in Billingkurst v. Walker, 2
Bro. 0. C. 604. In Belvedere v. Bockfort, 8upra, Mr. Thurlow,
afterwards Lord Chancellor, in arguing the question of the decedent's
intention before the House of Lords, contended that he had made
himself liable to the mortgagee at law. But as the decree of Lord
Oh. LnTORD was affirmed without opinion, there is nothing to show
that this position of counsel, which was not, as we have seen, essen-
tial to the decision of the question whether the decedent had mani-
fested an intention to make the encumbrance his own personal debt,
was acceded to. In Parsons v. Freeman, it was .expressly repudi-
ated, and Lord THURLOW, in Tweddell v. Tweddell, and Lord
ALVANLEY, in Woods v. Huntingford, expressed such positive dis-
approbation of Belvedere v. Bockfort, in all respects, that it cannot
now be considered law. See also Coote on Mortgages 491; 2
Jarman on Wills 556 ; 2 Powell on Devises 675 ; Williams on
Executors 1693; Fisher on Mortgages, sec. 1112.
In New Jersey there is no liability as in England, upon the pur-
chaser. of an equity of redemption to indemnify his vendor against
the encumbrances. The grantee of encumbered land does not
incur any personal responsibility for the encumbrances, .unless he
has expressly assumed them or has in some way shown his intention
to do so. No personal responsibility will attach to him, because the
conveyance describes itseV to be under and subject to encumbrances:
Stevenson v. Black, Saxton 388. The insertion of such a clause
is regarded simply as a notice to the purchaser that he is buying
only the equity of redemption, and so to qualify the covenants of
warranty upon the part of the grantor. But, if besides mentioning
the encumbrances, the amount of them is included in the considera-
tion, the purchaser will be held between himself and his vendor to
BY THE PURCHASER OF LAND.
have assumed the mortgage. Such was the case of Tichenor v.
-Dodd, 3 Green Ch. 455. The habendum clause of the deed was
"subject, &c., which said mortgage or the amount thereof is com-
puted as so much of the consideration to be paid to the said D. H.
Tichenor." The grantor having been compelled after a sale of the
premises to pay the deficiency, brought this action against the
grantee to recover the same, which was sustained. A fortior, this
is the case where the deed contains language expressly assuming
the mortgage: Hlapworth v. .Dres8ler, 2 Beas. Ch. 62. The re-
sponsibility incurred by the grantee is held as in England to be
that of indemnifying his grantor from ever paying the debt. In
Tiohenor v. Dodd, supra, the grantee's duty of indemnifying the
grantor was founded upon the English reasoning that he had been
allowed to retain in his hands enough out of the purchase-money
to do so. "By the terms of the deed, the mortgage-money was to
be taken as part of the consideration, and hence the second propo-
sition of counsel, that under such circumstances, equity raises upon
the conscience of the purchaser an obligation to indemnify the.
mortgagor is correct."
Although it is held that there is no direct relation between the
vendee and the owner of the encumbrance, the latter is allowed to
work out his own salvation in equity. In Kapworth v. Dremsler,
supra, Dressler bought premises, and having given a mortgage for
the purchase-money, conveyed them to Ise, the habendum clause
of the deed being "subject to a mortgage of $300 which H. Ise
does hereby agree and assume to pay, and it is so understood by
the parties to these presents." The mortgagees in a bill of fore-
closure asked for a decree for the deficiency against Ise. The
pinch of the case was whether the complainants, having no privity
of contract with Ise, or right against him at law, could get such a
decree against him in equity. GREEN, Ch., said, "The premises are
not merely conveyed to the plaintiff, subject to the mortgage-debt.
When this is done the grantee takes the premises subject to the
encumbrance, but incurs no personal responsibility. But the grant
here is made upon the specific condition that the grantee agrees
and assumes to pay the debt. By the acceptance of the title, the
clause becomes his covenant and he thereby becomes bound to the
grantor to pay the mortgage-debt, and liable to him for any defi-
ciency which may exist upon a sale of the mortgaged premises."
And he held that the grantee, Ise, having assumed for the grantor,
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Dressier, the debt due the complainant, he would be regarded in
equity as the principal debtor, and Dressler as the surety, and,
therefore, the complainant would be entitled to a decree against.
him for the deficiency, on the equitable principle that "a creditor
is entitled to the benefit of all collateral obligations for the pay-
ment of the debt for which a person standing in the situation of a
surety for others has received for his indemnity, and to relieve him
or his property from liability for such payment." In other words,
equity would enable the mortgagee to take advantage of the duty
of the grantee to indemnify the mortgagor. It is hard for the
mind to follow this equity, be6ause of the difficulty of regarding
the grantee, with whom the mortgagee has no connection, as his
principal debtor, and the mortgagor only as a surety. But all the
early cases which allowed the mortgagee to recover the deficiency
from the grantee, did so on this principle. It is better illustrated
by the case in which it was established: Curtis v. Tyler & Allen,
9 Paige 433. Tyler had given a bond and mortgage to Murray,
who assigned the same with a guarantee to Beers, who assigned the
same to the plaintiff. Subsequently to Murray's assignment the
'defendant, Allen, executed his bond to him, conditioned to pay the
mortgage or cause the same to be paid by Tyler. -In a bill of fore-
closure the plaintiff made Allen a party praying for a decree against
him for the deficiency, if any, upon sale of the premises. WAL-
WORTH, Oh., said, as Allen's bond was given "subsequent to the
assignment of the bond and mortgage to which it was intended to
be a collateral security, it is only upon a principle of equity that
the present holders of Tyler's bond and mortgage to Murray are
entitled to the benefit of this collateral bond. It is well settled,
howevier, that where a surety, or a person standing in the situation
of a surety, for the payment of a debt, received a security for his
indemnity and to discharge such indebtedness, the principal creditor
is in equity entitled to the full benefit of that security.. And it
makes no difference that such principal creditor did not act upon
the credit of such security in the first instance, or even know of
its existence." See also Vail v. Foster, 4 N. Y. 814. An ad-
ditional and simpler reason for this method of proceeding is given
in 0rowell v. The Hospital, 12 0. E. Green 650, viz.: That equity
permits it to avoid circuity of action.
So purely a duty of indemnifying his grantor is the assumption
of encumbrances by the grantee considered in New Jersey, that if
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for any reason he cease to owe indemnity to this grantor he ceases
to be responsible to any one for the encumbrances. For instance,
in Crowell v. The Hospital, supra, Currier conveyed premises to
the hospital, subject to the payment. of a mortgage held by com-
plainant, which the hospital assumed and agreed to pay, the amount
thereof having been deducted from the purchase-money. Subse-
quently the hospital reconveyed the premises to Currier, subject
to the mortgage in the same terms. The complainant, in a bill of
foreclosure, prayed that if the proceeds should be insufficient to
pay the mortgage, a decree for the deficiency might be made against
Currier and the hospital. The court held that the ditty of the hos-
pital to indemnify Currier having ceased by the reconveyance, their-
responsibility for the mortgage was extinguished. And so in the
case of Van Horn v. Powers, 11 0. E. Green 257. And in the
very recent cases of Bull v. Titsworth, 29 N. J. Eq. 73, and Cul-
ver v. Badger, Id. 78, it was held that.if the clause assuming am
encumbrance was inserted in the deed through fraud or mistake,.
the grantee would owe no indemnity to his grantor, and, therefore,
could not be held for any deficiency by the mortgagee. The same
conclusion would seem to follow, however the clause might be con-
strued, because the defence set up by the parties was substantially
that he had never made any agreement whatever.
By assuming a mortgage for the purpose of indemnifying his
grantor, the grantee does not make it his own personal debt, and
therefore, in the administration of his estate, it would remain a
charge upon the realty, and not be thrown upon his personalty for
payment. It is believed that the English authorities would be fol-
lowed upon this point. And even though the decedent had made
himself directly liable to the creditor, this, without other evidence
of his intention to throw the entcumbrance upon the personalty for
payment, would not be enough to do so: McLenahan v. McLena-
han, 3 C. E. Green 101.
In New York, it is held that taking premises under and subject
to encumbrances, imposes no personal responsibility for them on the
part of the grantee: Stebbins v. Hall, 29 Barb. 529; Mllotson v.
Boyd, 4 Sandf. 520.
Nor does it alter the case, as in New Jersey, that the amount of
the encumbrances is included in the consideration: Binsee v. Page.
1 Keyes 87; Belmont v. Coman, 22 N. Y. 431, in which the deed
recited a consideration of $12,000, "subject to four mortgages
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(described) amounting to the sum of $8500, which has been esti-
mated as part of the consideration-money of this conveyance, and
has been deducted therefrom." COMSTOCK, Ch. J., said: "It states
that the deed is subject to the mortgages, the sum of which
has been estimated as part of the purchase-money and deducted
therefrom. If the language had stopped with declaring the sub-
jection of the land to the lien of the mortgages, it would have been
the ordinary case of the purchase of a mere equity of redemption.
According to all the cases the land would have been the primary
fund for the payment of the mortgages, yet withoiit any other lia-
bility on the part of the grantee. But the other words, it seems to
me, import nothing additional or different. On the contrary, they
appear to be used for greater caution. They declare that the
amount of the mortgages has been deducted from the consideration
which had been previously set forth. The apparent meaning of
this is, that so much of the purchase-money as the mortgages amount
to being deducted, is not to be paid except as it is charged upon
the premises."
When, however, the deed contained language expressly assuming
the encumbrances, the liability of the grantee was considered to be
simply that of indemnifying his grantor, and the niortgagee was in
equity allowed to take advantage of this duty while it continued,
for the purpose of recovering any deficiency after a sale of the pre-
mises: Curtis v. Tjler, supra; -Blyer v. Monholland, 2 Sandf.
Ch. 478. Fitz Randolph sold premises to Monholland, "subject
to a mortgage made, &c., which the said party of the second part
hereby agrees and assumes to pay." SANDFORD, A. V. 0. : "It
was a simple contract debt for lands sold and conveyed by the one to
the other. The effect of this arrangement in equity, as between them,
was to make Fitz Randolph the surety of Monholland, in respect of
the debt due to the complainant. As between them and the com-
plainant, it is immaterial whether he was to regard the relationship
of principal and surety between them. It sufficed for them, that
be held this mortgage-debt against Fitz Randolph, and that the
latter had obtained the obligation of Mlonholland to himself to dis-
charge that debt. This obligation enured in equity to the benefit
of the complainant." See also Cornell v. Prescott, 2 Barb. 16;
Andrews v. Wolcott, 16 Id. 21; Mills v. Watson, 1 Sweeney 374;
Marsh v. Pike, 1 Sandf. Ch. 210.
Hence it followed, as in New Jersey, that if the grantor, for any
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reason, is not liable for the mortgage-debt, or if the grantee has
ceased to owe him any indemnity, the grantee will not be liable to
the mortgagee: King v. Whiteby, 10 Paige 465 ; Trotter v. Hfughes,
12 N. Y. 74.
But the decision of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 270, produced an
entirely new current or rather a whirlpool of authorities which
represent the law of New York to-day. Holly, at the request of
the defendant, loaned him $300, stating at the same time that he
himself owed and had promised to pay the plaintiff that amount the
next day, in consideration whereof the defendant promised to phy
the plaintiff for him the next day. Upon this promise it was held
that the plaintiff could maintain an action because it was made for
his benefit. Upon the strength of this case a mortgagee was allowed
in Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178, to sue the grantee in his own
name for the whole mortgage-debt, without any resort to the pre-
mises. The deed conveyed the premises "subject, &c., which mort-
gages are deemed and taken as a part of the consideration of this
conveyance, and which the party of the second part hereby assumes
to pay." DENIo, J.: "If the plaintiff had sought to foreclose the
mortgages in question, and to charge the defendant with the deficiency
which might remain after applying the proceeds of the sale, and had
made both the mortgagor and the present defendants parties, the
authorities would be *abundant to sustain the action in both aspects,
* * * but I do not understand that the right to a personal judgment
for the deficiency is based upon the notion of a direct contract between
the grantee of the equity of redemption and the holder of the mort-
gage. The cases proceed upon the principle that the undertaking
of the grantee to pay off the encumbrance is a collateral security
acquired by the mortgagor which enures by an equitable subroga-
tion to the benefit of the mortgagee; * * * the plaintiff does not
ask to foreclose the mortgage, and does not make the principal
debtor, Bullard, a party. If the judgment can be supported at all,
it must be on the broad principle that if one person make a prom-
ise to another for the benefit of a third person, that third person
may maintain an action on the promise. * * * Finally the ques-
tion came squarely before this court in Lawrence v. Box, supra,
and we held, with hesitation on the part of a portion of the judges
who concurred, while others dissented, that the action would lie."
In Thorp v. The Coal Company, 48 N: Y. 256, in which Zing v.
Whitely, supra, was expressly overruled, EARL, 0., said: "In the
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deed from Franklin to it the defendant expressly assumed to pay the
plaintiff's mortgage, and this, as it is now well settled, binds the de-
fendant to the same extent as if it had also signed the deed. There
has been some diversity of opinion as to the ground upon which the
liability of the grantee in a deed in such case must rest, and it has
finally been settled that it may rest upon the doctrine that where one
person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third person,
the third person may maintain an action upon it: Burr v. Beers,
24 N. Y. 178. In such a case it is not needful that there should
be any consideration passing from the third person. "It is sufficient
if the promise be made by the promisor upon a sufficient considera-
tion passing between him and his immediate promisee, and when
the third person adopts the act of the promisee in obtaining the
promise for his benefit, he is brought into privity with the pro-
misor, and he may enforce the promise as if it were made directly
to him." This was followed by Campbell v. Smith, 8 Hun 6 and
Vrooman v. Turner, Ibid. 78, in which the mortgagee was allowed
to recovers deficiency directly from a grantee, who owed his grantor
no indemnity whatever. How far the court went, may be seen
from the syllabus of the last case. "A. executed a mortgage on
certain premises to B., and afterwards sold and conveyed them to
C., and by various inesne conveyances they came to T., a married
woman. In none of the conveyances, except the one to T., was
there any covenant by the grantee to pay the said mortgage. Held
that T. was liable on. her covenant."
In icard v. Sanderson, 41 N. Y. 179, the owner of premises
subject to a mortgage conveyed them to the defendant to secure a
certain indebtedness due by him, no other consideration being paid.
The deed contained a clause that the defendant "agrees to pay off
and discharge the said mortgage as and for part of the considera-
tion-money of said premises." H7eld, he was liable for ny defi-
ciency after sale of the premises. It would seem from the facts
that the defendant had not purchased the premises" at all, but had
simply taken them in trust as a security for indebtedness, so that it
is hard to reconcile the decision with (arnsey v. Bogers, 47 N. Y.
284, in which the referee having reported that the absolute deed
to the defendant, containing an assumption of the plaintiff's mort-
gage, was intended by the parties as a mortgage, the court held
him not liable.
In Simpson v. Brown, 6 Hun 251, it was held, in accordance
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with Burr v. Beers, supra, that the mortgagor could not release
his guarantor so as to prevent the mortgagee from maintaining as-
sumpsit, while in Stephens v. Ga88backer, 8 Hun 117, it was held,
in accordance with the old principle of indemnity, that he could do
so. These cases show that the judicial mind is not yet on an even
keel, and it may be further disturbed by .Aerrill v. Green, 55 N. Y.
270; the facts of which were as follows: an incoming partner,
one of the defendants, gave a bond with the other defendant as
security to Roberts, the outgoing partner, that he would pay the debts
of the old firm. The plaintiffs, creditors of the old firm, brought
suit on this bond, which had been assigned to them by Roberts. It
was contended that they might recover under Lawrence v. Fox,
without the assignment of the bond, and the statement of that fact
in the complaint might be regarded as surplusage. GLOVER, J.,
"But I do not think the case within the principle of Lawrence v.
Fox. Green was liable with Roberts for'the payment of the firm
debts. He agreed with Roberts, upon a valid consideration, to
assume the payment of the whole of the debts, and Nichols under
took that he should perform this contract. This was no agreement
made by Green and Nichols with the creditors or for their benefit,
but one with Roberts to exonerate him from his liability for the
debts of the firm by payment, which Green was to make, and in
case of his default, such payment to be made by Nichols. All the
liability incurred by either, was-on the bond, and this was to the
obligee only." Upon the principle as thus stated, it would be hard
to sustain the right of the mortgagee to sue the vendee directly.
Chancellor KENT, in Cumberland v. Codrington, 3 John. Ch. Ca.
229, adopted the principle of Tweddell v. Tweddell, supra, in the
administration of a decedent's estate to the full. But in 1830 the
law was changed by the Revised Statutes (1 R. S. 749, sec. 4), pro-
viding that mortgages should always be paid by the realty, unless
in the case of a will it were specially directed otherwise. The
statute does not apply to liens which arise by operation of law as
for unpaid purchase-money: Wright v. Holbrook, 32 N. Y. 587;
lanport v. Beeman, 34 Barb. 239; and as to such cases it is
probable, in the light of Burr v. Beers, that Cumberland v. Cod-
rington does not express the law of to-day.
H. G. W.
(To be continued.)
